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Abstract 
Referring to the argument that a state’s historic background and geographic location in 
the world are inherent elements of its foreign policy narrative which constitutes its iden-
tity, this article examined and brought narratives on the reconstruction of Turkish for-
eign policy towards the Middle East which was directed by a foreign policy doctrine of 
Davutoğlu as defined Davutoğlu Doctrine. Using a critical constructivist perspective, it 
contends that Davutoğlu’s foreign policy vision for Turkey is an attempt to reconstruct 
the international role and responsibilities of Turkey through a transformed identity 
based on a reinterpretation of its historical heritage and geographic location. This article 
concluded that the Davutoğlu Doctrine’s vision was not only an endeavor to overturn 
the traditional tendencies in Turkish foreign policy, but also in any ways, is a task of 
identity transformation. Further, this new activism has led to a shift in the axis of its 
foreign policy from the Western orientation to a more assertive, strict independent for-
eign policy that is central to the Davutoğlu Doctrine. Finally, Davutoglu Doctrine can 
be recognized that it has reconstructed Turkey’s state identity to reshape Turkish foreign 
policy onwards to the Middle East aiming to reposition Turkey as the global representa-
tive and a key player in the region. 
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Introduction 
After the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AK Party) 
came to power in 2002, Turkish Foreign Policy had undergone a significant transfor-
mation. The key actor behind this transformation was Ahmet Davutoğlu.1 He is better 
known as the chief architect of the Turkish Foreign Policy since his appointment from 
the post of chief advisor to the Prime Minister from 2002 to 2009, then as the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs from 2009 to 2014, lastly as the Prime Minister from 2014 to 2016. 
Davutoğlu’s vision of Turkey in the international politics has been widely discussed on 
                                                 
1
Murat Yeşiltaş, “Turkey’s Quest for a ‘New International Order’: The Discourse of Civilization 
and the Politics of Restoration”, Perceptions, Vol. XIX Issue 4 (2014), pp. 43-76. 
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various literatures on Turkish Foreign Policy, such as Yeşiltaş (2014) tells about the 
discursive transformation of the geopolitical vision in Turkish Foreign Policy
2
 and then 
Aras (2014) tells about how the Davutoğlu Era shaped and ruled Turkish Foreign Poli-
cy
3
. Especially after he was appointed as the Foreign Minister in 2009, discussions, 
such as articulated by Yeşiltaş, had ranged between whether Davutoğlu’s vision pointed 
to a rupture in the traditional role and identity which modelled for Turkey as a bridge 
between continents with an inherently Western character, whose foundations were laid 
largely by the Turkish Revolution and the newly created Turkish Republic. It had been 
argued by Yeşiltaş, that what the AK Party heralded, under the intellectual leadership of 
Davutoğlu, was a symbolic return to the past, through stylized references to the glory 
days of the Ottoman Empire, during which ‘the Türks’ had played a central role in their 
region and beyond. This article is examines and brings the description of “Davutoğlu 
Doctrine” and see how the doctrine shaped the Turkey’s state identity and directed 
Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. Within this study, the author uses the 
constructivist theoretical framework to approach the concept on identity. 
Particularly, discussion on Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East nowadays 
has increased significantly as a subject of interest in academic circles and policy mak-
ers. Turkey has become increasingly active and assertive in its policies in the Middle 
East. At the same time, Turkey has claimed to develop a comprehensive foreign policy 
strategy towards the region. Within this context, Turkey began to emphasize in the im-
provement of its relations with the neighboring countries, demonstrated an eagerness to 
play the role of a mediator, promoted its soft power, and engaged in increasing econom-
ic relations with the countries in the region.
4
 
The main focus of this study is the overall identity constructions that brings the 
identity narrative and explore the responsibilities, hierarchies and foreign policy actions. 
For this aim, the study examines the foreign policy narrative of the key authoritative 
speaker and intellectual architect of Turkish foreign policy, Ahmet Davutoğlu. The 
study does not claim to provide an exhaustive analysis of Turkish foreign policy and 
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Bülent Aras, “Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy Revisited”, Journal of Balkan and Near 
Eastern Studies, Vol. 16 Issue 4 (2014), pp. 404-418. 
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Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring”, 
SAM (Centre for Strategic Research), Vol. 3 (2012), pp. 1-14. 
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identity reconstruction process under the AK Party; rather it aims to shed light on the 
building blocks of this process through a study of Davutoğlu’s writings and interviews. 
Thus, the study provides a critical constructivist explanation to understand Davutoğlu’s 
foreign policy vision in the Middle East. 
 
Critical Constructivism and Identity-Turkish Foreign Policy Nexus 
Researching on identity and foreign policy inevitably will find link to construc-
tivism. The frame of constructivist, International Relations (IR) has many twists and 
turns, but the main thread is the mainstreaming of the claim that reality and knowledge 
are constructed socially and politically, contingently, and at various levels that can be 
debated. Apparently, the core of constructivist begin when the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the end of the Cold War. The red-faced of the inability to predict the dra-
matic event, the mainstream scholar turned his attention to the alternatives offered by 
dissidents since at least the 1980s.
5
 One alternative is constructivism, a theoretical sys-
tem with an almost strengthening potential, as the starting sociologist of the field de-
scribed at the time.
6
 
In foreign policy analysis, the main channel of constructivist influence is identi-
ty and, in particular, the identity of the state. In the early 2000s, an emerging trading 
zone developed; identity, one of the main theoretical works of constructivist accounts of 
global politics, became foreign policy.
7
 
The fundamental difference between conventional and critical constructivism is, 
as said by Cho (2009), that while conventional constructivism focuses on the subject of 
intersubjective ontology, critical constructivism distinguishes itself through its focus on 
the construction of discursive social realities. Thus, the difference between conventional 
and critical constructivism lies not in their assumptions about the existence of an objec-
tive world but its emphasis on language as an intermediary is symbolized; exist but its 
meaning is shaped through discourse. Therefore, meaning is not an individual or collec-
tive, but a social phenomenon. It should be noted that everyone has different ideas in 
                                                 
5
Emanuel Adler, Constructivism in International Relations: Sources, Contributions, and  
Debates, in Handbook of International Relations (London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2013), pp. 112-144. 
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each head, but that meanings inheriting in practice and the category in which people are 
related to each other and the environment.
8
 
By the elaboration of the reading of Wendt (1999), Adler (2013), and Zehfuss 
(2001) can be concluded that the key concepts of critical constructivism in IR are 
shaped discursively through the representation of states and linguistic elements. To ex-
plore how this concept is formed, critical constructivists engage in detailed text research 
to understand the system of meaning and representation. Besides, critical constructivist 
critics are more pluralistic than their conventional counterparts in terms of methodolo-
gy, which includes the use of post-positivist methods such as discourse analysis.
9
 
Regarding identity, Cho (2009) adds that critical constructivism takes into ac-
count how people recognize a particular identity and related narrative, and focuses on 
the role played by the differences, the practices and other representations of this dis-
course.
10
 Also, by the reading of Onuf (2016), critical constructivist explores how 
agents use this identity to justify certain foreign policies rather than identify the impact 
of this identity as conventional constructivist use. Thus, critical constructivism aims to 
blow the myths associated with identity formation, while the conventional constructivist 
focuses on the treatment of that identity as a possible action.
11
 
By establishing this foundation, it is said in this study that there is a close rela-
tionship between foreign policy and Turkey’s state identity representation. This connec-
tion is sealed by the overall need for security and concerns with Turkey’s general direc-
tion. 
Turkey’s state identity and foreign policy are supposed ontologically associated 
through discursive performances of foreign policy in which the identity arises, which in 
its place is built as legitimacy for the proposed policy. Foreign policy issues that Turkey 
proposes in international politics are political acts, not facts. They are social construc-
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Young Chul Cho, “Conventional and Critical Constructivist Approaches to National Security: 
An Analytical Survey”, The Korean Journal of International Relations, Vol. 49 Issue 3 (2009), pp. 75-
102. 
9
See Alexander E. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), Emanuel Adler, Loc.Cit., and Maja Zehfuss, “Constructivism and Identity: A 
Dangerous Liaison”, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 7 Issue 3 (2001), pp. 315-348. 
10
Young Chul Cho, “Conventional and Critical Constructivist Approaches to National Security: 
An Analytical Survey”, The Korean Journal of International Relations, Vol. 49 Issue 3 (2009), pp. 75-
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tions advanced by the state officials in the process of producing and reproducing the 
identity of the state.
12
 
In the context of foreign policy discourse of political elites, two dimensions of 
narrative about identity play a key role in shaping their vision and responsibilities corre-
sponding to the state. It is said space, time, and responsibility are the great concepts 
through which the political community is; limitations, internal constitutions, and rela-
tionships with the outside world are important and debatable. The temporal aspect of 
identity; how identity is represented in its experience with the past, present, and future 
collectivities around the theme of progress, its impact on the vision of its foreign gov-
ernment because the political subject is always formed in time. Linked with this, it can 
be argued that the way history and the legacy of Turkey are interpreted and portrayed in 
the Davutoğlu’s discourses not only form the way in which the Turkish political elite 
perceives the state’s position and responsibility to its neighbors but also affects Tur-
key’s wider foreign policy objectives with the wider international politics.13 
Moreover, the spatial aspect of identity focuses on the bonds that bind itself to 
space and certain geography, and involves drawing space for existence through the con-
struction of boundaries. In most cases, the geographical location of actors is seen as 
providing opportunities and/or even barriers in foreign policy. Articulation of the di-
mensions of identity is important to determine the playing field limit for actors, who, in 
the case of Turkey, define the actors and frontiers of the surrounding neighborhood and 
beyond. Such discursive practice also finds Turkey in the world and builds relations be-
tween Turkey and others in the form of neighbors, partners, allies, rivals and challeng-
ers.
14
 
Narratives on identity and Turkish foreign policy choices, by Bozdağlıoğlu 
(2008), are articulated through the discursive practices of a number of authoritative dis-
cursive agents whose positions are defined in the political process that grants privileges 
to some and marginalizes others. This process, which functions based on the existing 
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discursive structure, determines which sounds are worth listening to and assessed on a 
particular issue. While it is true that a large number of discursive agents contribute to 
dominant and marginalized debates and discourses, some decision-makers usually have 
a stronger voice based on their institutional power.
15
 
 
Davutoğlu Doctrine: the Overview of Strategic Depth 
Grand Strategy is a concept that is designed to connect all sources of state power 
to achieve political goals.
16
 In this case, the draft grand strategy for Turkey is strongly 
influenced by aspects of geography and history. Geographically, Turkey is at the cross-
roads of three continents of Asia, Europe and Africa stretching from the Anatolian pen-
insula of Southwest Asia to the Balkans of southeastern Europe. The Asian and Europe-
an regions are separated by the Marmara Sea that is part of the Turkish region. Turkey 
is flanked by the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. In addition, the Turkish 
region is complemented by the marine richness of Marmara with an excellent maritime 
climate that contributes to the trade routes and marine fleet base. This unique Turkish 
geographical position has implications for Turkey’s geopolitical policy which is often 
used for expansion during the Ottoman Empire.
17
 
Since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey until the end of the Cold War 
in 1991, a grand strategy embraced by Turkey is Kemalism or Kemalist reforms intro-
duced by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Kemalist substantially reform has taken root and 
change the political, cultural, and economic systems based on the previous Turkish Is-
lamic values in the reign of the Ottoman, Türks changed to Western values or also 
called Europeanization.
18
 
During the Cold War, pro-Western identity which was introduced by Atatürk re-
gained one with the involvement of Turkey in the Marshall Plan project was initiated by 
the United States. This project provides an opportunity to the integration of Turkey and 
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Europe, where Turkey contributed to the Committee for European Economic Coopera-
tion (CEEC), the European Recovery Program (ERP), the Organization for European 
Economic Cooperation (OEEC).
19
 In addition to the Marshall Plan involved in 
the project, Turkey was joined by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
which is allied defense pact in 1952.
20
 The participation of Turkey in NATO started to 
show the openness of relations between Turkey and the European Union in the field of 
security, in which Turkey contributes in the fight against the expansion of the Soviet 
Union into the European and Mediterranean regions.
21
 
Europeanization, which rose during the Cold War was also led Turkey to the de-
sire to join the European Economic Community (EEC). Turkey finally submitted its 
membership proposal officially on April 14, 1987.
22
 The European Commission then 
responded to Turkey’s request in 1989 with suspension of membership discussions. The 
suspension was later discussed again in the 1990s when a single market in the European 
Union was in operation. In 1995, the negotiations ultimately resulted in the entry of 
Turkey into the EU customs union in 1995, exactly three years after the operation of the 
European Union single market.
23
 
The entry of Turkey into the European Union customs union to make this coun-
try closer to the European Union, especially in terms of economy and trade. But at the 
same time, Turkish Kemalism eroded grand strategy. This is due to internal and external 
factors. From internal factors, Turkey experienced a government crisis. The Turkish 
government, which at the time was dominated by military forces, had failed to win the 
support of civil society. As for external factors, Turkey faced a system change since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, where Turkey’s strongest allies the Europe and the United 
States changed Turkish foreign policy focus from security to global economic coopera-
tion. This change brings the cultural shock of the concept of grand strategy Kemalism is 
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still focused on security. So that in the 1990s, Turkish foreign policy has faced the glob-
al challenge which is requires Turkey to make a reconsideration of grand strate-
gy orientation.
24
 
Since the victory of the AK Party in the elections of 2002, there has been a 
change in the orientation of the Turkish grand strategy. The change occurred after the 
emergence of a doctrine known as the “strategic depth”. The doctrine was a manifesta-
tion of the idea of Ahmet Davutoğlu in 2001. He was better known as the chief architect 
of the Turkish Foreign Policy since his appointment to the post of chief advisor to the 
Prime Minister from 2002 to 2009, then as the Minister of Foreign Affairs From 2009 to 
2014, lastly as the Prime Minister from 2014 to 2016.
25
 
Davutoğlu argued that by having strategic depth, Turkey can apply a multidi-
mensional policy and claim a central role in global politics. Moreover, this doctrine also 
insists on a change of Turkish foreign policy into a militaristic emphasis on soft pow-
er to promote the strength of the economic policy, democratization, and conflict resolu-
tion. This is further reinforced by the argument of Davutoğlu that, 
 
“Turkey enjoys multiple regional identities and thus has the responsibility to follow an integrat-
ed and multidimensional foreign policy. The unique combination of our history and geography 
brings with it a sense of responsibility to actively contribute towards conflict resolution and in-
ternational peace and security in All These areas is a call of duty arising from the depths of a 
multidimensional history for Turkey.”26 
 
Davutoğlu’s statement explained that the doctrine of strategic depth was influ-
enced by factors of history and geography. As the reading of Yeşiltaş (2013), in this 
case, Davutoğlu voiced again the new Ottomans by extending Turkish foreign policy 
influence beyond the limits of Ottoman rule and reintroducing Islamic val-
ues. Therefore, Turkish foreign policy this time is not only oriented on one side of the 
West, but also has expanded to the Balkans, Caucasus, Asia, and the Middle East.
27
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Davutoğlu has stressed the idea that since Turkey should take on the role as a 
key country, its new position should be one that provides security and stability not only 
for itself, but also for its neighboring regions. He links Turkey’s own security and sta-
bility to the opportunity of taking on a more active, constructive role in order to provide 
order, stability and security in its environs. In his article Turkish foreign policy Vision, 
Davutoğlu outlines five principles of Turkish foreign policy making process. They are; 
(1) balance between security and democracy, 
(2) a ‘zero problem policy with Turkey’s neighbors’, 
(3) developing relations with neighboring regions and beyond, 
(4) adherence to a multi-dimensional foreign policy, 
(5) and, rhythmic diplomacy.28 
In regards to the Middle East, Davutoğlu (2008) mentions four main principles 
on which Turkey needs to rely on in order to further establish its position in this region; 
(1) security for everyone, which means security for the entire region, (2) priority must 
be given to dialogue as means of solving crises, (3) economic interdependence, and (4) 
cultural coexistence and plurality.
29
 As Aras (2014) said, naturally, Davutoğlu’s foreign 
policy doctrine has received much criticism. The main criticism is the neo-Ottomanist 
dimension of his vision, which places Turkish foreign policy activity mostly in former 
Ottoman territories. Aras argues that by making boundaries, de facto, meaningless while 
respecting national sovereignty, Davutoğlu has created a geopolitical disposition that 
exhibits a tendency of returning to the former Ottoman Empire’s backyard.30 
In general, the Davutoğlu Doctrine has brought changes to Turkish foreign poli-
cy. The change can be seen from the transformation of Turkish foreign policy during the 
Cold War that acted as a Western ally in the fight against the expansion of the Soviet 
Union has now changed to become more dynamic. The dynamic changes can be seen 
from Turkey’s efforts to establish good relations and closeness with neighboring coun-
tries. Nevertheless, the ideas about the strategic depth, Davutoğlu  stated that, 
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“We do not leave our destiny in the hands of others... The critical term here is inclusiveness; we 
have to be inclusive because we are all Caucasus, we are the Balkans, we are the Middle East, 
and we are Europe.”31 
 
The Davutoğlu’s statement makes it clear that Turkish foreign policy is inclu-
sive, so, it is part of another region. Nonetheless, Davutoğlu still states that Turkey is 
Europe. This can be interpreted as Turkey’s wishes are still not faded to want full mem-
bership status in the European Union. Turkey is still seeking its access process. 
According to the elaboration writings of Yeşiltaş (2013), Aras (2014), and 
Murinson (2006), the author sees that Davutoğlu Doctrine through his Strategic Depth 
has policy implications for Turkish foreign policy, those are, 
(1) Refocusing Turkey’s historic alliances 
(a) Traditional allies like the United States and Europe are important, but new em-
phasis needs to be paid to former estranged neighbors such as Russia and Iran. 
(b) New alliances with emerging powers like the Chinese and India help to ‘bal-
ance’ Turkey’s dependency on the West. 
(2) Greater identification with Turkey’s former Ottoman space 
(a) Renewed interest in engaging Muslim former colonies that might welcome 
Turkey’s return to the Middle East with particular focus on Syria and Iraq. 
(b) Taking on greater responsibility for regional stability in the Balkans through 
working with new allies such as Serbia and Russia in addition to its NATO ob-
ligations. 
(c) Resolving of historic differences with Armenia to enhance greater cooperation 
throughout the Caucus given Turkey’s central role. 
(3) Reaching Beyond the Ottomans 
(a) Emphasizing Turkey’s role in the Muslim world and historic relations with Af-
ghanistan and Pakistan while building stronger connections with places as far 
away as Malaysia (Davutoğlu has a personal affinity given his tenure as a visit-
ing professor here) and Indonesia. 
(b) Engaging Central Asia and offering an economic model of development 
through Turkish businesses, construction, education, and NGOs.
32
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Redefining Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Middle East 
Studies of Turkish foreign policy arose significantly after the end of the Cold 
War. The starting of Turkey to the world economy and changing politics through the 
Özal administration was a significant factor adding to this new influx of scholarship. 
Changes within the international politics and a rising issue on potential foreign align-
ments also impacted this pattern.
33
 According to Fuller (2008), amid 1990s, the debates 
about Turkish foreign policy of Turkey concentrated mainly on its relationships with 
Israel. The Turkish government preferred to boost its relationships with the state of Is-
rael sometimes at the expense of its relationships with the other countries in the region. 
This situation proceed until the 2000s and major changes in regional politics as well as 
Turkey’s relationships with the Middle Eastern region.34 
The Davutoğlu Doctrine has been one of the very most frequently cited and de-
bated topics of Turkish foreign policy in recent years. Davutoğlu’s publication concerns 
on Turkey’s repositioning in the international politics in the post-Cold War period.35 
Davutoğlu expresses his goals as providing an analysis of Turkish strategic depth that 
considers its historical background as well as the geocultural, geopolitical and geoeco-
nomic dimensions of Turkish foreign policy.
36
 For him, the shift to a dynamic interna-
tional politics after a comparatively static bipolar system through the Cold War creates a 
significant challenge for examining Turkish foreign policy.
37
 
Regarding to Davutoğlu (2001), Turkey stands at an important turning point in 
history, as such, Turkey needs to integrate the depth of its own history and geography 
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through a rational strategic vision, which will provide a pro-active actions. Analyzing 
the domestic aspect alongside the dynamic dimensions of the international politics spe-
cifically will pave the way for the emergence of alternative perspectives that may fill up 
the voids in Turkey’s strategic vision. Suggesting alternative perspectives for Turkish 
foreign policy is incredibly innovative in an interval where the European union was 
considered the only dimension of Turkish foreign policy, and Turkish foreign policy 
makers experienced segregated consequently of self-isolation from the Middle East and 
exclusion from the European Union.
38
 
In his idea, Davutoğlu concerns on the lack of a strategic dimension in Turkish 
foreign policy. According to him, extreme pessimism and exaggerated optimism regard-
ing the Turkey’s future role in the international politics is accountable for the partly lack 
of a strategic vision. This was relatively a result of the unstable political environment in 
Turkey in the 1990s. Instability in different coalition governments’ approach to foreign 
policy was challenged by the risk averse and pro-status quo Turkish foreign policy bu-
reaucracy, which in turn created contradictory messages in foreign policy.
39
 
According to Davutoğlu (2001), there are numerous known reasons for Turkey’s 
failure in designing strategic theory. First, the institutional framework of Turkish for-
eign policy making does not allow foreign policy makers to build up alternative strate-
gic view. Second, Davutoğlu claimed that historical background also creates an im-
portant impediment to more active foreign policy making.
40
 
The final contribution to Turkey’s insufficient strategic vision has to do with 
problems about historical consciousness as well as a concern of split identity. According 
to Davutoğlu (2013), failing to identify historical continuities leads to the polarization 
of the society and a clash of identities domestically. This also engenders significant con-
tradictions between domestic and external identities. Turkey, to become more effective, 
needs to design a harmony between two identities. Davutoğlu argues, it might be ex-
tremely problematic for a country that does not have historical memory space and con-
sciousness to leave its mark on background. The factor that distinguishes between coun-
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tries, shapes the stream of history and it is designed by external developments is just 
how that these countries approach their own histories.
41
 
Davutoğlu (2001) claims, that Turkey began to feel the lack of a strategic vision 
more seriously following the aftermath of the Cold War. The changes in power configu-
rations during this time period compelled Turkey to reevaluate its position in the inter-
national politics. According to Davutoğlu (2001), this era actually offers a great deal of 
opportunities for states that are getting ready to proceed to an upper level in the interna-
tional politics. Through the immediate end of the Cold War, however, Turkey was not 
prepared to optimize this opportunity due to a lack of strategic vision. Further, Turkey 
was concurrently experiencing significant domestic debates regarding political identity, 
culture, and legitimacy. To avoid similar failures, Davutoğlu (2001) offers a schema for 
Turkish foreign policy makers; the first step in overcoming such a chaotic situation is 
spotting particularities of Turkey’s political cultural infrastructure.42 
Davutoğlu (2001) adds that there are certain characteristics that produce Tur-
key’s political culture not the same as others. Historically, it retains an important space 
where significant global powers once existed geopolitically. This central position and 
following engagement with other centers of civilization deeply impacted the sociology 
of Turkish political culture. The West’s beat of and later collapse of the Ottoman Em-
pire created a significant role in the forming of this new political sociology. Despite 
their rivalry and the Ottoman lack of power, Turkish political elites wished to integrate 
the newly founded republic in the Western bloc, and especially in Europe. However, the 
West rejected Turkey’s attempts in most instances. According to Davutoğlu (2001), 
what makes Turkey unique in this situation is partly due to this contradiction between 
historical significance and simultaneous attempt to integrate itself into another civiliza-
tion.
43
 
The strategic depth discourse developed by Davutoğlu in the recent years trans-
formed Turkish foreign policy both in theory and practice. The transformation was rec-
ognized in foreign policy visions. Foreign policy was purged of the concerns and 
changes of domestic politics. Foreign policy that served as an instrument of domestic 
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politics became a factor that delineated domestic. Using the advancement of the strate-
gic depth discourse, a safer domestic political system became essential to be able to per-
form more decisive practices in foreign policy. The envisioned restructuring of foreign 
policy for more effective stand in the international politics required the undertaking of a 
couple of initiatives to be able to reshape politics on the domestic level. In addition, 
economic developments, political progress, dynamic social actors, democratic im-
provement and concord with opposition allowed Turkey to try out a more effective role 
in international politics. Turkey considered it a basic principle to cooperate with interna-
tional actors using its deposition historical and civilizational.
44
 
A multi-dimensional and implementation of varied strategies in foreign policy 
strengthened Turkey’s position. A well balanced approach to politics among all global 
and local actors originated. While proceeding with the accession negotiations, it em-
barked on an activity of unifying neighbor states in assistance and undertook new initia-
tives towards states situated further geographically. Turkey became a more outspoken 
and self-confident country in the international politics through its independent interna-
tional actions. It really is highly possible for Turkey to become global actor in the near 
future, so long as it achieves a nationwide coherence through the resolution of its cur-
rent domestic issues, and so long as it creates good use of opportunities and its own stra-
tegic plans.
45
 
Through the Davutoğlu Doctrine, Turkey’s national politics, identity and its own 
relationship with its neighbors were redefined and reconstituted.
46
 Though it is difficult 
to evaluate the Davutoğlu Doctrine’s strategic depth that shaped Turkey’s latest foreign 
policy in terms of conventional IR theories developed in the West, it could be situated 
in the conceptual map of IR theories closer to the critical constructivist approach. 
The strategic culture that establishes the process of foreign policy making can be 
an after effect of the structuring and restructuring of state identity at the intersection of 
the perception of space based on geographic data and the perception of time based on a 
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historical consciousness. According to Davutoğlu (2001), a fragmented sense of identity 
caused by the lack of strategic vision, a torn country and historical consciousness are 
along the way of constructing a new historical narrative following the establishment of 
the Republic of Turkey, the new elite, rejecting Turkey’s historical inheritance, endeav-
ored towards a national identity that designates Turkey as part of the West. However, 
under the AK Party’s leadership is able to convert this historical inheritance into a se-
cured asset in its foreign policy practices. Hence, modify the national identity. There-
fore, as the historical inheritance in Kemalist foreign policy functioned as a negative 
constitutive factor, in the AK Party foreign policy under Davutoğlu Doctrine, it serves 
as a positive factor. Bearing semblance to the idea New Ottomanism developed by the 
end of the 80s during Özal’s administration as an alternative to the negative conations 
assigned to Turkey’s historical inheritance, Davutoğlu’s strategy, since 2003, requires 
this cultural inheritance as historical, geographical, and social reference in his initia-
tives.
47
 
The transformation of Turkish foreign policy, aligned with the critical construc-
tivist approach, can be explained by the amendment of Turkey’s national, social and 
civilizational identity triggered by the redefined perceptions of the parameters of risk to 
its national security such as its geographical location, particularly of Istanbul, and own 
relations with its neighbors, particularly designation of friend and foe, because the re-
construction of political, economic and social structures necessitates a redefinition of 
relationships as well. Each instance of construction and reconstruction needs the struc-
turing and restructuring of foreign policy.
48
 
Therefore, according to Yeşiltaş (2013), which of the transformation factors are 
more effective can only be revealed by the end of the process of construction and recon-
struction required by the developments in the domestic and international environment, 
the brand new state following the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, was con-
structed based on a new Western identity that originated by following developments in 
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the West. The new country was set up based on political nationalism inspired by the 
French Revolution.
49
 
To be able to accommodate the sustainability and endurance of the identity and 
new political regime, remnants of principles from the old regime were taken off. The 
transformation recognized through the first years of the Republic is a manifestation of 
the move. A whole lot of attention was paid so that new nation state was constructed as 
a modern and Western state based on the principles of nationalism and secularism. Ac-
cording to Yeşiltaş (2014), Turkey’s foreign and domestic policies were identified and 
executed in relative to this new state identity. Within the domestic level, any activity or 
group opposing the existing regime was excluded from the political stage with accusa-
tions of partisanship, factionalism and reactionary politics. That is best illuminated by 
the actual fact that both most deployed principles in addition to nationalism and laicism, 
reactionarism (Islamic) and factionalism (Kurdish) remain at the guts of political, eco-
nomic and social debates.
50
 
In tandem with this new identity, in the time immediately subsequent the after-
math of the world war where Turkey suffered huge territorial and material harms, Tur-
key followed a formal foreign policy that was focus about maintaining the status quo. It 
built relationships with all new states established with Western assistance, because of 
the affiliation with the West, especially with those in near vicinity. This move prompted 
colder, more distanced relationships with countries where Turkey experienced distribut-
ed a common historical background and geography. The Middle Eastern region was 
avoided and otherized because any assistance or coalition with this region evoked imag-
es of the past the new nation-states were endeavoring to purge. Manifestations of the 
Western approach were able to be viewed in Turkey’s perceptions of Iran and Israel in 
terms of their nuclear energy and weapon activities. In the Turkish public sphere, while 
silence is managed about the nuclear weapons Israel presently possesses, much is said 
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about Iran’s acquisition of weapons. The missiles produced by Iran are characterized as 
worrisome for Turkey.
51
 
With the Davutoğlu Doctrine, according to Davutoğlu (2001), Turkey entered 
the process of delineating a new identity more suitable to its new dynamics and the new 
developments in the international politics. According to the new identity, the conven-
tional nation-state discourses are being deserted in favor of debate on civilization. 
Thought to be New Ottomanism, the process of constructing a new identity that is more 
inclusive and more suitable to the process of globalization has started in Turkey. 
Through the construction of the new identity how national interest and recognized 
threats were described is transformed, new conception of threats are constructed. Con-
ceptions of interest constructed in the West in Turkey’s name are steadily being aban-
doned.
52
 
Existent threats have been reinterpreted from a Turkey-centric perspective. 
Through this framework, based on Davutoğlu’s strategic vision, initiatives to develop 
close relationships among states long regarded as threats such as Iran, Syria, Iraq and 
Armenia are applied. Along the way of constructing the new identity, historical back-
ground is conceived as field of opportunity and not as an encumbrance as it was once 
was conceived. Specifically, the Ottoman legacy that was ignored was reinvigorated and 
a focus on historical depth started to surface in foreign policy debate. A newfound im-
portance is assigned to Turkey’s historical values as well as the values borrowed from 
the West. Quite simply, in juxtaposition with the Western principles of democracy, pri-
macy of the law, and free market, new principles are being produced consequently of 
the East-West synthesis and of the remembrance of the multicultural and pluralist past.
53
 
Turkey attempts to possess historical, geographical, strategic, political and civi-
lizational depth on the regional, international and universal level. For Turkey, to be-
come one of the new primary powers in the international politics, it first needs to con-
quer its national issues. As the construction of a new identity requires the restructuring 
of both national and international politics, to be able to bring its political initiatives to-
                                                 
51
Bülent Aras and Aylin Gorener, “National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policy Orientation: 
The Ideational Bases of the Justice and Development Party’s Foreign Policy Activism in the Middle 
East”, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies,  Vol.12 Issue 1 (2010), pp. 73-92. 
52
Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik, (Istanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2001). 
53İlter Turan, “Turkey’s Iran Policy: Moving Away from Tradition?”, Analysis on Turkey, (June 
25, 2010), pp. 1-3. 
Edi Miranto 
236 
wards the Middle Eastern region to fruition, Turkey first needs to ensure the success of 
its current democratic initiatives towards Kurdish and Alevi minorities.
54
 
Under the Davutoğlu Doctrine, equilibrium between democracy and security in 
the restructuring of domestic politics was discussed. When foreign policy is conceived 
as an expansion of domestic politics, it is obvious to see that steps used towards the de-
mocratization of the country not only enhances the stability of the country, but also 
evolves more effective, constructive, and peacefulness promoting foreign policy. State’s 
legitimacy is most beneficial justified by its capability to provide security because of its 
citizens. However, this security can not be achieved through limitation of freedoms and 
human rights in the country. Freedom can not be sacrificed in the name of security. Sac-
rificing freedom in the name of security makes the area for authoritarian regime to pene-
trate. Under the new identity of Turkey, attempts are created to improve civil liberties 
without ignoring the nation’s security.55 
This discourse is evinced from the initiatives made towards Kurdish and Alevi 
minorities and progress manufactured in the process of accession to European Union. 
Because of the balance achieved between security and democracy, Davutoğlu (2014) 
emphasizes Turkey’s latest foreign policy is more emphasis on soft power than hard 
power. The practice of securitization of most foreign policy issues within the last dec-
ades has been abandoned steadily. Soft power factors assist in execution the soft balanc-
ing strategy. Turkey is attaining a reputation as a financing and donor country. Perhaps 
due to these developments, Istanbul gained preeminence in foreign policy rather than 
Ankara, which reflects the traditional nationalist state perspective. As the image of two 
civilizations so that as the bridge between two continents, Istanbul is accepted as a uni-
versal center where universal values are easily accommodated. Because of this, in the 
recent period many bilateral and multilateral international conferences took place in Is-
tanbul rather than in Ankara.
56
 
In addition, based on Davutoğlu (2014) Doctrine’s executions, for the first time 
in Turkish history, non-state actors such as civil society organizations began to take part 
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in foreign policy effectively in their functions of providing support and assistance to 
governmental activities. Civil society organizations, think tanks, companies and charity 
organizations were turned on to be able to actualize the new foreign policy discourse. 
As example, TÜSİAD (Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği, the Turkish Industry 
and Business Association) and MÜSİAD (Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği, the 
Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association), which are represent the busi-
ness world, participate the activities towards speeding the process of accession to the 
European Union, also facilitates the improvement of relationships with the Middle East-
ern region. Furthermore, various civil society and human rights organizations support 
the new foreign policy with their initiatives in a variety of countries such as Pakistan, 
Indonesia, and Palestine.
57
 
Foreign policy practices, based on Davutoğlu’s Doctrine that executed by the 
AK Party governments since 2003, hold an important philosophical depth, efforts and 
variety to restructure, incommensurable to the preceding governments. As consequence 
of this foreign policy, considered as the strategic depth policy, Turkey started to try out 
increasingly more important roles in regional turmoil and participated in almost all 
global developments. Due to the rapid extension of its foreign policies, Turkey became 
a country to be paid attention. Turkey, trough Ottoman legacy growing economy and 
civilizational deposition, can be one of the major players of the international politics, so 
long as it overcomes international and especially domestic obstructions with regards to 
its new foreign policy.
58
 
Together with involvement of the domestic non-state actors in foreign policy 
making, Turkey concerned on developing relationships with international non-state ac-
tors. Under the Davutoğlu Doctrine, Turkey applied politics actively with various com-
munities, nations, and regions outcome developed constructive communication with 
these actors. While maintaining the traditional vigorous relationship with the West, 
Turkey started to consider a dynamic role in the regional politics of the Middle East. It 
performed an operating role in the international crises including Syria, Iraq, Palestine, 
and Afghanistan. Psychological obstructions that arose in the Middle East in the 20th 
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century and became persistent were eliminated. Turkey interacted with political actors 
situated in the various fronts in the Middle East such as Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
Lebanon, and Hamas. While only states were considered legitimate actors during the 
prior governments in Turkey, the AK Party authorities developed relationships with 
Shia, Kurdish and Turkic groups and made improvement in short time. This change in 
domestic politics actually performed an important role in the construction of a new 
identity in Turkish foreign policy. It had been a construction that occurred through 
transformation of domestic politics.
59
 
Turkey, under Davutoğlu Doctrine, reconstructed its relationships with the 
neighboring countries. According to Davutoğlu (2002), first, working under the zero 
problems with neighbors principles, started mending relationships and offering solu-
tions to existing problems. Then, under the maximum cooperation principles, it aimed to 
jumpstart an activity of unification by optimizing the potential of cooperation between 
the countries. Because of these principles Turkey no more recognized itself as a country 
surround by its enemies. Concrete steps towards resolving the issues with neighboring 
countries and cofounding establishments that could work to determine common goals. 
After attaining resolutions to issues with Syria, Iraq, Iran, Turkey shifted onto resolving 
its problems with Armenia. After completing the first stage achieving a zero problems 
level using its neighboring countries, Turkey is executing policies to achieve relation-
ships based on maximum degrees of assistance in recognizing common interests. The 
prospective is the invigoration of relationships which were originally founded on geo-
graphical and historical depth.
60
 
There have been also some dimensions that people may consider as intermestic 
which experienced major transformations through the rule of Davutoğlu Doctrine. Aside 
from under Özal administration, until 2000s, Turkey implemented an exclusionary for-
eign policy. Through the rule of the AK Party administration, a far more constructive 
and more inclusive political and diplomatic discourse originated.
61
 As Bozdağlıoğlu 
(2008) stated, Turkey was characterized as a country surrounded with enemies in every 
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path under the Kemalist leadership, as well as for Turkey’s traditional political elite, 
Türks did not have any friends apart from Türks. Kemalist Turkey, to be able to ensure 
its presence and security was perpetually seeking equilibrium of power as ascertained 
by the widespread IR ideas. Having identified its foreign policy and international ac-
tions under the influence of these prevalent ideas, Kemalist Turkey implemented an an-
tagonistic foreign policy.
62
 However, according to Yeşiltaş (2013), under the the 
Davutoğlu Doctrine, an inclusive and constructive discourse was developed. This new 
vocabulary, discourse, and tone of voice aimed to construct a new way of doing poli-
tics.
63
 
Davutoğlu criticized several prominent ideas developed in the end of the Cold 
War and defended by a huge group of Westerners, such as the new world order, the ul-
timate end of history and the clash of civilizations. He defended the alternative ap-
proaches such as shifting the homogenizing ramifications of globalization towards an 
experience that promotes distinctions and as enhancing dialogs between civilizations. 
These assertions Davutoğlu manufactured were calls to Western powers to abandon 
their hegemonic discourses. Turkey, under Davutoğlu Doctrine, aimed to boost the effi-
ciency of traditional civilizations, especially of Islam as a prerequisite of the civiliza-
tional discourse and also to advance an alternative discourse to Western conceptions 
based on conflict. Among the reasons that produce Davutoğlu policies the prospective 
of insistent criticism by Westerners is its purported goal of revitalizing the civilization 
discourse. Turkey aspires to make use of its Ottoman inheritance and the revitalization 
of the Islamic civilization, in its foreign policy, as a constitutive power factor.
64
 
Turkey hosted variety of important international meetings in the recent years. 
Turkey’s cultural, bureaucratic, economic and social actors are functioning with an un-
precedented vigor. The level of strength in diplomatic relationships can be easily dis-
cerned from the amount of international meetings that took place in Turkey since 2003, 
multilateral meetings such as the NATO Summit in 2004, African Summit in 2005, and 
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bilateral meetings such as Solana-Larijani in 2007. Turkey also hosted immediate meet-
ings for the actors of regional disputes, such as indirect encounter between Syria and 
Israel and direct encounters between Afghanistan and Pakistan took place in Istanbul. 
Turkey’s leaders also deploy active diplomatic strategy. The travel itinerary of 
Abdullah Gül was only since 2009 testifies to Turkey’s active role in the region. The 
president visited to Riyad to speak at the Consultative Assembly of Saudi Arabia in 
2009, to Iran for the EcoSummit, to Iraq to mediate the Talabani-Barzani encounter. 
The president is an active player in the international politics although presidential office 
is a comparatively symbolic office in Turkey. Turkey applies a dynamic diplomatic 
strategy not only to its own international problems with regional or global causes, but 
also to international crises that does not involve Turkey directly. Turkey took effort in 
resolving regional issues rather than looking forward to the West to consider the first 
step. For example, pursuing Israel’s attacks on Gaza towards the end of 2008, Erdoğan 
visited four important Arab countries, while Davutoğlu traveled back and forth between 
Damascus and Cairo. Erdogan’s intervention of the tensions between Iran-Pakistan and 
Iraq-Syria after terrorist attacks in Iran and Iraq was enough to evince the active role 
Turkey takes on in regional politics. 
This new Turkey’s identity, according to Davutoğlu (2001),  promotes equidis-
tance in its interactions with others, establishing coalitions to resolve problems and ini-
tiating wide based strategic actions. It pays particular focus on not taking sides and stay-
ing disinterested in issues, and makes constructive movements towards a win-win strat-
egy to assuage concerns of the international actors. To be able to initiate a peace-
building and mitigating role in the answer of regional issues, it insists on taking precau-
tionary measures to be able to raise the trust between Turkey and countries with which 
it interacts. For instance, Turkey is the only country that maintains constructive rela-
tionships with all actors in Iraq. To be able to gain stability in Iraq, Turkey works re-
lentlessly on the international systems to be able to achieve stability, security and unity 
in the country.
65
 
Davutoğlu Doctrine’s approach makes national borders obsolete used while still 
respecting the national sovereignty of the states. Some initiatives used under this ap-
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proach aim to make the idea of national borders in the Middle East, especially those at-
tracted by foreign capabilities in southern Turkey irrelevant. Davutoğlu (2001) urges 
that the idea of nation state is a Western invention rather than universal unit of political 
evaluation. He put forwards the importance of historical and geographical factors in the 
development of relations among states and requires these factors into consideration 
while delineating approaches for Turkey’s relationship with states in its proximity.66 
Instead of prejudiced discourses utilized by the United States such as character-
izing its adversaries as the axis of rogue states, Turkey purports to build axis of stability 
and also to this end, promotes new discourses predicated on the civilizational particular-
ities of the geographical and strategic regions where it is situated. Looking to build rela-
tionships among states, not by otherizing but by accommodating, Turkey started to 
work at building an axis of stability in the regions. According to Davutoğlu Doctrine, 
any development in the region could cause a domino impact. Since regional political 
and financial issues are closely related to each other, development in virtually any one 
of these may have a negative or positive influence on the region. Therefore, to be able to 
attain stability in the region, the domino tiles must be constructed well ensuring the fall 
of the first tile towards the right direction.
67
 
In Turkey’s new inclusive foreign policy predicated on civilizational founda-
tions, an optimistic sum game predicated on the win-win strategy is recommended to 
the zero sum game in its relationships with its neighbors. To this end, new strategic ap-
proaches to its issues with Cyprus, Kurds, Iraq, Iran and Armenia are constructed. Be-
cause of this transformation in Turkish foreign policy, a positive change in perceptions 
of Turkey in its region has been noticed. Turkey’s new strategy of emphasizing assis-
tance and coalition improved its regional image.
68
 
According to Davutoğlu (2014), Turkey’s relatively steady and intensifying de-
mocracy, its powerful political institutions, developed economy, historical accumula-
tion, strategic depth, civilizational discourse and cultural development combines to im-
press the states and society of the region. Under the Davutoğlu Doctrine which was con-
structed by the AK Party and aligned with the conceptual construction summarized 
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above, Turkey started to check out a multi-dimensional, multi sided, and multitracked 
foreign policy. The new foreign policy constructed in different dimensions.
69
 
The mainstream theoretical approaches, such as liberalism and realism, are fails 
to clarify the change in foreign policy in Turkey. The transformation can be described 
best through the use of the theoretical tools of critical constructivism. What occurred in 
Turkey was an elaborate process which includes the change of state and foreign policy 
identity from within, through a significant change in domestic politics and discourse on 
foreign policy through the activities of different actors and from outside, through a 
transformation of Turkey’s relationships using its neighbor actors. 
The result of the transformation was a Turkish foreign policy with a new identi-
ty. Three dimensions of the new identity especially differed from the premises of the 
traditional foreign policy. Firstly, contrary to the realist discourse it began to interact 
with informal actors. Secondly, it started to develop close relationships with groups of 
states that engage in various ideologies and regimes. And lastly, non-state actors are 
representing different parts of the country, for the first time involved in the process of 
foreign policy making. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
This article concluded that the Davutoğlu Doctrine’s vision is not only an en-
deavor to overturn the traditional tendencies in Turkish foreign policy, but also in any 
ways, is a task of identity transformation. This new activism has led to a shift in the axis 
of its foreign policy from the Western orientation to a more assertive, strict independent 
foreign policy that is central to the Davutoğlu’s foreign policy doctrine. However, this 
does not cause a new company’s axis, while trying to engage in independent foreign 
policy in the Middle East, Turkey continues to rely on the West and still continues to 
pursue European Union full membership. 
Such activism was turned on through the construction of an identity articulated 
based on a reinterpretation of Turkey’s historical background and geographic location. 
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Regarding this, although some argued that Davutoğlu’s vision of a new and focus on 
critical civilization as a new political device represented an anti-hegemonic try to de-
qualify the West as the epitome of civilization and the guts of world politics, his foreign 
policy vision in reality contains components of another hegemonic premise to the ex-
tends that it generates power hierarchies within this civilization. 
Davutoğlu assert along the relative lines of this new vision, Davutoğlu embarked 
on the proactive foreign policy on multiple fronts including the Middle East, to trans-
form Turkey into a key regional power. In addition, Davutoğlu has been quite constant 
in his articulation of Turkey’s identity and the duties that this entail consistent with 
Turkey’s ascribed role as a central and sensible country. Meanwhile, it needs to be not-
ed that the construction of a particular identity and a new vision foreign policy, particu-
larly predicated on closer relationships with neighbors and including such duties as an 
international mediator, ultimately depends on the acknowledgement of Turkey as a 
credible and influential actor by the other actors. 
As the strong identity that Davutoğlu constructed for Turkey is appears as an op-
timistic development and a way to obtain satisfaction for his country in the domestic 
entrance at least for a certain percentage of the Turkish population as there is a signifi-
cant opposition to the foreign policy of the AK Party administration, its success in for-
eign policy depends upon not only tangible outputs but also others’ perceptions of Tur-
key, it is identity and aims in the relationships. 
This is specially the case when one requires under consideration the rigid hierar-
chies created and reproduced in the foreign policy discourse of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
between Turkey and other associates of the so-called Islamic civilization. As interesting 
this new vision is, if Turkey’s others do not agree with the aims and process of Turkey’s 
new foreign policy, and also identify using its neo-Ottoman tone at times, then it is 
doomed to fail. It is eventually the external perception and acceptance of Turkey among 
not only the other members of the civilization, but also other major actors in the interna-
tional politics, that could determine the success of Turkey’s new foreign policy vision 
and identity. 
This positive external conception and approval has proven difficult as yet, espe-
cially in light of the recent advancements in Syria, Iraq, and the region. Therefore, it 
could be concluded that this new identity and foreign policy became a step much for the 
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AK Party administration and Davutoğlu as their ultimate architect, which the recourses 
and references to the imperial historical background and geography of Turkey did not 
have the required effect on Turkey’s current foreign policy, this is what makes this issue 
unique and worthy of further study. 
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